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ABSTRACT 
NARRATIVES BY 6-YEAR-OLD AND 9-YEAR-OLD BOYS: 
BRUTE, INSTITUTIONAL, AND NON-INSTITUTIONAL MENTAL FACTS 
by Adam Craig Whipple 
December 2013 
Brute facts, institutional facts, and non-institutional mental facts were studied. 
The philosophy of constructionism and the theory of intent provided a framework for this 
research. Intentionality provided the basis for social facts. Brute, institutional, and non-
institutional mental facts were operationally defined. This study analyzed the use of 
these facts in the narratives of 6-year-old boys and 9-year-old boys. There were a total of 
19 participants in this research. 
This research established brute, institutional, and non-institutional mental facts as 
appropriate operational categories for studying children's narratives. The 6-year-old 
boys produced more brute facts than the 9-year-old boys. The 9-year-old boys produced 
significantly more institutional facts in spontaneous narratives than the 6-year-old boys. 
The production of non-institutional mental facts was not significantly different between 
the two groups. 
The discussion pertained to the ramifications of these results as related to 
spontaneous language samples, appropriate language sampling size, and the syntagmatic-
paradigmatic shift. 
11 
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS 
The writer would like to first and foremost thank the thesis supervisor, Dr. John 
Muma, for his encouragement and advice throughout this project, and for transmitting to 
me his appreciation for scholarship. It was his zeal for advancing scholarship within the 
field of speech-language pathology that sparked this research, and it was his reservoir of 
knowledge and experience that guided me along the way. 
I would like to thank Dr. Steve Cloud for serving as a committee member, and for 
a short conversation in which he instilled in me the confidence in myself to undertake this 
task. I would like to thank Dr. Jennifer Salgo-Corie for serving as a committee member, 
and for stressing the relevance and importance of research and evidence-based practices 
in her courses. I would like to thank Dr. Edward Goshorn for his invaluable assistance in 
the statistical analysis involved in this study. I would like to thank the Human Subjects 
Committee for their consent for this study; their consent form is located in Appendix A. 
I would like to acknowledge my wife, Jessi, for her constant support throughout 
this endeavor. 
lll 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
ABSTRACT ... ... .. .... ... ... .. ... .... ... .. .... .... .. ........ .......... ... .. .. ... .. ... ........ .. ....... .... .... ........... ....... . ii 
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS ... .... .. .... ...... ......... ....... ... .. .. ... .... .......... ...... .. .... ... .. ....... .... .... .... .. iii 
LIST OF TABLES .... .... .. .... .. .. .................. ... ......... ... ... ...... ....... .... .. ... .............. ..... ..... ... ... ... .. V 
LIST OF ILLUSTRATIONS ... .... .... ..... .. .. ........ .. ................ ...... ... .. .. ... ....... .. .. ... .. .. .. ..... ...... vi 
CHAPTER 
I. INTRODUCTION ........... ... ... .. .. .. .......... ... ...... .... .. .... ............. .... ... .. .. .. ... .. ... . 1 
Problem Statement 
Significance of the Study 
II. REVIEW OF THE LITERATURE ... ..... ...... ............. ..... ........ .. ....... .... ... .. ... . 3 
Constructionism 
Intent 
Social Facts 
Brute, Institutional, and Non-Institutional Mental Facts 
Brute and Institutional Values 
Ill METHODOLOGY ... .. .. .... .. .... ....... .. .. ....... .. .. .. .... ....... ..... ....... ..... .. .. .. ...... ... 16 
Research Question, Hypothesis, and Variables 
Operational Procedures 
IV. RESULTS ...... .... .... .. .... .. .... .... .... ... .. .. .. ... .. .... .... ........... .... .... ..... .. ...... ...... .. ... 19 
Descriptive Evidence 
Appropriate Categories 
Discussion 
V. CONCLUSION ... ...... ......... ... ... ... ...... ....... ......... .. ..... .. .......... ......... ... ... .. ..... 28 
APPENDIXES .. .. ... .. ... ... .... ... ... ........ ...... .... .......... ........... ..... ... ... ...... .. ...... ... ..... ..... .... ......... 30 
REFERENCES .. ... .. ............... .......... .... .. ........ .............. .... .... .. .... ................. .... ... ... ..... .... .... 36 
IV 
LIST OFT ABLES 
Table 
1. Descriptive Group Statistics for 6-Year-Old and 9-Year-Old Boys ...................... 20 
2. Paired Comparisons for Brute (B), Institutional (I), and Non-Institutional 
Mental Facts (N) for 6-Year-Old and 9-Year-Old Boys within Age Groups ........ 22 
3. Independent Samples Test Comparing Production of Brute Facts (B), 
Institutional Facts (I), and Non-Institutional Mental Facts (N) in 6-Year-Old 
Boys and 9-Year-Old Boys across Age Groups ... ... .. ........ .... ... .. ......... .. ... ...... ....... 23 
V 
LIST OF ILLUSTRATIONS 
Figure 
1. Mean Proportion of Production of Brute (B), Institutional (I), and 
Non-Institutional Mental Facts (N) in Narratives of 6-Year-Old and 
9-Year-Old Boys .... ...... .... ............................................... ................ ................. ...... 21 
VI 
CHAPTER I 
INTRODUCTION 
Problem Statement 
Several scholars have discussed institutional facts and the distinction between 
brute and institutional facts (Anscombe, 1958; Lakoff, 1987; Searle, 2011). Searle 
(2011) stated, "We live in a sea of human institutional facts" (p. 90). Hund ( 1982) stated, 
"Most philosophers have been perfectly ready to accept the notion of 'brute' facts , but 
they have preferred to ignore the notion of ' social, ' 'societal, ' or 'institutional ' facts" (p. 
271 ). Searle ( 1997) stated that " ... since institutional reality is in some sense our creation 
we ought to be able to state precisely the mechanisms of that creation and the ontology of 
the resulting structure" (p. 458). Insofar as our society is impacted by institutional facts, 
their existence and their use in social commerce warrant research. 
Searle ( 1969) stated that the traditional models of language are "incapable of 
dealing with institutional facts" (p. 184 ). Perhaps what Searle suggested is that the 
traditional models do not consider consciousness and intent. Inasmuch as consciousness 
and intent are significant features of brute and institutional facts, it is understandable why 
Searle made this comment. 
Lakoff ( 1987) stated, " . . . unresolved is the question of whether a clear division 
exists between brute facts and institutional facts" (p. 170). While scholars have discussed 
brute and institutional facts and have provided preliminary definitions, no previous 
operational definitions have been outlined. Likewise, no previous research has been 
carried out to determine the difference in the use of brute and institutional facts in actual 
social commerce. An analysis of the use of brute and institutional facts in spontaneous 
language samples has yet to be carried out. Such research could contribute to an 
understanding of language abilities. 
Significance of the Study 
The authors of this study operationally defined brute facts and institutional facts 
for the first time, thus providing a framework for working definitions for this and future 
studies. This study investigated the existence of non-institutional mental facts and 
likewise operationally defined them. This study compared the difference in the use of 
brute facts, institutional facts, and non-institutional mental facts in the narratives of 6-
year-old boys and 9-year-old boys. 
2 
A spontaneous language sample often leads to a useful grammatical analysis of a 
child's repertoire. This study considered the use of brute, institutional, and non-
institutional mental facts in children's narratives as a possible companion to grammatical 
assessment. Presumably, this study will lead to further research concerning these facts 
and their use in spontaneous narratives of children. 
3 
CHAPTER II 
REVIEW OF THE LITERATURE 
Constructionism 
Constructionism is a philosophical view of language. Bruner ( 1986) stated that 
constructionism recognizes the "mind as an instrument of construction" (p. 97). The 
basic tenant of constructionism is that a child is an active processor of the world in which 
he lives. Berger and Ludemann (1989) stated," ... reality is socially constructed" (p. 1). 
Berger and Luckmann ( 1989) further stated, "Everyday life presents itself as a reality 
interpreted by men and subjectively meaningful to them as a coherent world" (p. 19). 
Searle ( 1995) stated, " ... we do not experience things as material objects, much less as 
collections of molecules. Rather, we experience a world of chairs and tables, houses and 
cars, lecture halls, pictures, streets, gardens, houses, and so forth" (p. 14). 
To use one of Searle 's examples, a car is actually a collection of metal, rubber, 
and other materials. When one views an attractive new car, it is unlikely that he would 
say to himself the following: / want to own that collection of metal and rubber. Rather, 
he would more likely say to himself the following: / want to own that car. At some 
point, probably early in childhood, that individual would have learned to experience that 
collection of metal and rubber as a car. This is possible as an individual constructs 
mental representations of his environment. 
Bruner (1986) stated that a child actively constructs possible worlds through the 
"transformation of worlds and world versions already made" (p. 97). Sperber and Wilson 
(1986) stated, "An individual 's total cognitive environment...consists of not only all the 
facts that he is aware of, but also all the facts that he is capable of becoming aware of ... " 
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(p. 39). Bruner (1986) stated, "We do not begin with something absolute or prior to all 
reasoning, but. .. begin instead with the kinds of construction that lead to the creation of 
worlds" (p. 97). Sperber and Wilson (1986) stated, "We are all engaged in a lifetime's 
enterprise of deriving information from this common environment and constructing the 
best possible mental representation of it" (p. 38). In this way we move "from electrons to 
elections and from protons to presidents" (Searle, 2011, p. 1 ). 
To use the latter of Searle's examples, it is unlikely that a child would view 
President Obama as only a collection of protons and other molecules. Rather, a young 
child may likely view President Obama first only as a man, just as any other man. Later, 
as a child begins to construct mental representations of countries and governments, he 
may then understand that President Obama is indeed the President and leader of a nation. 
Some philosophies of the mind and language indicate an opposition between 
mental states and physical reality, between culture and biology. However, Searle ( 1992) 
stated, "Mental phenomena are caused by neurophysiological processes in the brain and 
are themselves features of the brain" (p. 1 ). Additionally, Searle (1995) stated, 
" ... mental states are higher-level features of our nervous system ... " and, " ... there is no 
opposition between culture and biology; culture is the form that biology takes" (p. 227). 
Searle (2011) stated, "Consciousness and intentionality are caused by and realized in 
neurobiology" (p. 25). Rather than being isolated entities, the mind, culture, and mental 
states are inseparably connected to biology, physical reality, and the brain. Furthermore, 
Searle ( 1995) stated that "the connecting terms between biology and culture 
are ... consciousness and intentionality" (p. 228). Therefore, consciousness in general, 
and intent in particular, are irreducible issues of language. 
Intent 
Humans deal with intentionality, and Searle (1995) defined intentionality as "the 
capacity of an organism to represent objects and states of affairs in the world to itself' 
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(p. 7). Searle (2011) subsequently defined intentionality as " ... that capacity of the mind 
by which it is directed at, or about, objects and states of affairs in the world" (p. 25). 
Sperber and Wilson ( 1986) stated, "Intentions are mental representations capable of being 
realised in the form of actions" (p. 31 ). Nelson ( 1996) defined intentionality as "a 
person's intention to carry out an action" (p. 293). Whenever an individual deals with 
belief, desire, want, need, etc., that individual deals with intentionality. 
Intent is the driving force of language. According to Bruner (1986), intent is the 
"what for" of language (p. 157). Intent gives purpose to phonemes, meaning to 
morphemes, and significance to syntax. Nelson (1996) stated, "It is the intentionality of 
the actors that provides the consciousness, and ultimately the meaning, to the story" 
(p. 188). Searle ( 1992) stated, "Consciousness is indeed consciousness of something, and 
the 'of in 'consciousness of is the 'of' of intentionality" (p. 130). When an individual is 
conscious of a belief, desire, want, need, etc., he is conscious of his intentionality, and it 
is the intentionality which gives significance to language. 
Language provides a social platform for expressing human intents. The primary 
focus of language is the manifestation of intent, and all structured forms of language 
serve intent. According to Searle ( 1969), language is "rule-governed intentional 
behavior" (p. 16). Bruner ( 1986) stated, "Discourse is governed by the communicative 
intentions of speakers" (p. 81). Sperber and Wilson (1986) stated that language is 
important because" . .. communication exploits that ability of humans to attribute 
intentions to each other. .. " (p. 24). Additionally, Sperber and Wilson (1986) said, 
"Utterances are used not only to convey thoughts but to reveal the speaker's attitude to, 
or relation to, the thought expressed" (p. 10-11 ). Therefore, language exists so that 
human intents might become transmittable and recognizable (Sperber & Wilson, 1986). 
Searle (1992) stated, "Any attempt to reduce intentionality to something nonmental will 
always fail because it leaves out intentionality" (p. 51 ). If intent is removed from 
language, a meaningless system of codes and symbols remains. 
One unique attribute of language is its arbitrariness. A word is different from its 
referent. A referent can be an idea, a concept, or an object. For example, the word table 
does not have the physical form of an actual table. The set of five graphemes that 
constitute the word table refers to an object. The word is arbitrary in form. Nelson 
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( 1996) stated, "Language brings mental models under symbolic control" (p. 68). The five 
graphemes that represent a table are the structure under which a table is brought under 
symbolic control. Rather than structure, function is the crucial issue. Nelson (1996) 
stated, "Its structure emerges from its function but is not its primary focus. This 
development must then be understood within the experiential-social-communicative 
system" (p. 114). The structure of language has as much meaning and purpose as its 
accompanying functions, consciousness and intention, allow. 
Social Facts 
In addition to the intentionality of an individual, there is also collective 
intentionality (Searle, 1995). Searle (2011) stated, "Collective intentionality is a type of 
intentionality, and society is created by collective intentionality" (p. 25). Collective 
intentionality refers to two or more individuals intending to do something together, such 
7 
as violinists playing together in an orchestra (Searle, 1995). When a group has collective 
intention, they have the" ... capacity of conscious agents to create social facts ... " and 
social reality (Searle, 1995, p. 19). Similarly, Wagner (1998) stated, "A constructive 
event is an event in the course of which a something is named, equipped with attributes 
and values, and integrated into a socially meaningful world" (p. 307). 
Collective intentionality allows for humans to have the capacity to assign status 
functions, which means " ... to impose functions on objects and people where the objects 
and the people cannot perform the functions solely in virtue of their physical structure. 
The performance of the function requires that there be a collectively recognized status 
that the person or object has, and it is only in virtue of that status that the person or object 
can perform the function in question" (Searle, 2011, p. 7). The existence of the planet 
earth is true independent of human agreement and collective intentionality. In contrast, 
the existence of the state of Mississippi depends upon a collective agreement that the 
mass of land bordered by the Mississippi River and the Gulf of Mexico is in fact a state 
named Mississippi. The land itself has no governmental status by virtue of its physical 
features alone. Its status as an independent state is only a fact as long as a collective 
society considers it so. 
Searle ( 1995) stated that " ... social reality is created by us for our purposes and 
seems as readily intelligible to us as those purposes themselves" (p. 4). In most cases, it 
is easier to perceive objects and states of affairs "in terms of their socially defined 
functions ," rather than in terms of their molecules and physical reality (Searle, 1995, 
p. 4). Moreover, Searle (1995) stated, " ... once there is no function, no answer to the 
question, what's it for? we are left with a harder intellectual task of identifying things in 
terms of their intrinsic features without reference to our interests, purposes, and goals" 
(p. 5). This concept is coherent with the theory of relevance, which is the idea that 
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" ... there is a single property - relevance - which makes information worth processing for 
a human being" (Sperber & Wilson, 1986, p. 46). Sperber and Wilson ( 1986) stated, 
" ... humans automatically turn their attention to what seems most relevant to them" 
(p. 50). Berger and Luckmann (1989) stated that " ... knowledge of everyday life is 
structured in terms of relevances" (p. 45). 
Searle (1995) identified social facts as a subcategory of mental facts. First, what 
is a fact? Frege ( 1956) stated, "A fact is a thought that is true" (p. 307). Mental facts are 
those facts which "are dependent on [humans] for their existence" (Searle, 1995, p. 9). 
The following is an example of a mental fact: I want to go on vacation. For this sentence 
to be true, a conscious human being must exist. The following sentence is an example of 
a social fact: We want to go on vacation together. This sentence requires the existence of 
two or more conscious individuals in order to be a fact. Likewise, the existence of the 
state of Mississippi is a social fact, because a society of conscious humans must believe 
in and agree upon the fact for it to exist. 
Brute, Institutional, and Non-Institutional Mental Facts 
Searle (1995) considered mental facts as being the opposite of brute facts. Lakoff 
(1987) stated that brute facts are " ... those that are true regardless of any human 
institution. Thus, someone's height is a brute fact, as is the atomic weight of gold" 
(p. 170). Searle (1995) defined brute facts as" ... facts totally independent of any human 
opinions .. . Brute facts require no human institutions for their existence" (p. 2). 
Anscombe (1958) defined brute facts as " ... the facts which held, and in virtue of which, 
in a proper context, such-and-such a description is true or false, and which are more 
'brute' than the alleged fact answering to that description" (p. 71 ). 
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The following is an example of a brute fact: The meadow is full of grass. This 
sentence can be true independent of all human institutions and opinions. Whether or not 
a human or group of humans believes, opines, or declares that the meadow is full of grass 
has no actual bearing on the existence of this fact. Another example of a brute fact is the 
following sentence: Earth has one moon. This statement is a fact, regardless of any 
social or cultural agreement. A brute fact is a matter of the physical world and biology 
(Searle, 1995). 
Humans deal with more than brute facts. Anscombe (1958) first suggested the 
idea that the world included not only brute facts, but also institutional facts upon which 
society is built. Berger and Luckmann (1989) stated, "Society is a human product" 
(p. 61). Zaibert (1999) said, "Some facts can exist independently of human beings and 
their institutions; the existence of other facts depends on human institutions" (p. 274). 
MacCormick (1998) stated, "Our judgment of the state of the world is not simply in terms 
of pure physical fact and relationships, but in terms of an understanding of such facts and 
relationships as humanly meaningful" (p. 323). 
Institutional facts comprise a subcategory of social facts, which are in turn a 
subcategory of mental facts (Searle, 1995). Institutional facts are, therefore, a type of 
social mental facts. First, what is an institution? Searle (2011) stated, "An institution is a 
system of constitutive rules" (p. 10). Anscombe ( 1958) stated, "The existence of the 
description A in the language in which it occurs presupposes a context, which we will call 
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'the institution behind A' ... For example, the institution of buying and selling is 
presupposed to the description 'sending a bill'" (p. 72). Berger and Ludemann (1989) 
stated that institutionalization is " ... the foundation for the social construction of reality" 
(p. 182). Human institutions include systems such as "money, property, governments, 
and marriages" (Searle, 1995, p. 1). Other examples of institutions include such things 
as sports leagues, holidays, and elected positions. These entities are created by humans 
and remain in existence based upon social norms or rules. Berger and Luckmann ( 1989) 
stated, "Institutions ... by the very fact of their existence, control human conduct by 
setting up predefined patterns of conduct" (p. 55). 
Lakoff ( 1987) defined institutional facts as facts " ... that are true by virtue of 
some human institution. Someone's social standing and the dollar value of gold are 
institutional facts" (p. 170). Searle (1995) posited that " . .. these are things that exist only 
because we believe them to exist. .. facts dependent on human agreement. .. Institutional 
facts are so called because they require human institutions for their existence" (pp. 1-2). 
Hulsen ( 1998) stated that " ... an institutional fact is a meaning-content which achieves 
intersubjective existence simply and solely by being generally accepted as such" (p. 284). 
Therefore, in the case of Anscombe's example, receiving a bill is an institutional fact. 
Speaking in brute terms, an individual may in fact be receiving a sheet of paper with ink 
markings. The paper with ink becomes a bill once certain rules and norms are accepted 
by a group of individuals, acting with collective intentionality. 
Therefore, a mental fact may be a social fact if its existence involves two or more 
individuals. Subsequently, a social fact may be an institutional fact if its existence is 
dependent upon human institutions. A mental fact may exist independent of human 
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institutions. Mental facts which exist independent of institutional facts are non-
institutional mental facts. The following sentence is an example of a mental fact that 
exists independent of human institutions: We need the paper. The intention of needing 
was performed by two or more individuals; however, this fact can exist independent of 
collective human acceptance or recognition. Paper is paper "in virtue of intrinsic 
physical structure" (Searle, 1995, p. 124). If the sentence is slightly altered- We need 
the bill - then the new sentence becomes an institutional fact. The paper is now given a 
social status. The existence of a bill requires certain "constitutive rules" upon which the 
human institution of commerce is predicated (Searle, 1969, p. 186). 
Searle ( 1997) stated, "Institutional facts require the existence of social 
institutions" (p. 452). Searle ( 1997) stated, "The institutional fact that I bought a car with 
money can only exist within such institutions as money, property and exchange" 
(p. 452). The following example of a mental fact - / want to be with you - is dependent 
upon the consciousness of one individual. If made plural - We want to be together - the 
sentence becomes a social fact. If a human institution (marriage) is included - We want 
to be married - the sentence becomes an institutional fact. 
The following is another example of an institutional fact: The book costs 20 
dollars. In order for this sentence to be a fact, the human institution of money must exist. 
The paper, fiber, and ink that comprise a 20 dollar bill are recognized as a 20 dollar bill 
based upon the human institutions of money and commerce. This sentence requires 
human agreement regarding the worth of a dollar. Another example of an institutional 
fact is the following sentence: Barack Obama is the President. This sentence requires the 
human institution of democratic government and human agreement regarding voting 
rights and voting procedures for its existence. An institutional fact is a matter of culture 
and society (Searle, 1995). 
Searle ( 1995) held that all institutional facts are reducible to brute facts and 
require brute facts in order to exist. The previous institutional fact can be reduced to a 
brute fact by doing away with societal norms, voting regulations, and constitutional 
declarations. The following is an example of a possible remaining brute fact: Barack 
Obama is a human. The fact that Barack Obama is a human exists independent of 
societal acceptance. Hulsen (1998) stated, "An institutional fact is a fact simply and 
solely because it receives acceptance as a fact" (p. 286). 
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The following institutional fact will now be examined: The team played a 
basketball game. The game of basketball only exists " . .. in the light of a common belief 
that the situation is the case" (Hulsen, 1998, p. 284). Plausibly, five individuals could 
work together to place a ball through a circle without playing a basketball game. The 
existence of basketball and other sports " ... are facts, not because they are states of 
affairs, but because they are generally accepted as states of affairs" (Hulsen, 1998, 
p. 284). The following statement is a brute fact: Five individuals place a ball through a 
circle. For this brute fact to be transformed into an institutional fact, a group must accept 
a set of rules or norms. Hulsen (1998) stated, " ... the facticity of an institutional fact 
depends on its being internalized by the members of a group. For it is only on this 
condition that an institutional fact can have the same kind of incontestability as a brute 
fact" (p. 285). Once the rules and norms of basketball are accepted by a group and 
applied to the previously stated brute fact, the following institutional fact may be created: 
The team played a game of basketball. As MacCormick ( 1998) stated, "That the one 
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counts as the other depends on the possibility of interpreting what occurs in the light of a 
norm or norms, that may range from the most informal implicit norm or convention to the 
most highly formalized and articulated rule" (p. 333). 
Important to this study is the consideration of fictional characters as institutional 
facts. Hulsen (1998) posited that the existence of Santa Claus is an institutional fact, 
insofar as Santa Claus is being discussed by children who believe in Santa Claus. Hulsen 
( 1998) stated that because a group of adults know Santa Claus to be a fictitious character, 
to them his existence ceases to be an institutional fact. As Searle (1995) stated, 
institutional facts are " ... things that exist only because we believe them to exist. .. facts 
dependent on human agreement" (p. 1-2). 
Speaking in brute terms, fictional characters such as those seen on television 
cartoons may actually be sketches, drawings, or animation. For example, the existence of 
one large black circle with two smaller adjoining black circles is a brute fact. In contrast, 
the existence of Mickey Mouse is an institutional fact. If a child utters the following 
sentence - / want to watch Mickey Mouse - the child is producing an institutional fact. 
The existence of Santa Claus and Mickey Mouse depend upon collective human 
agreement. Although they remain fictitious, humans have agreed them into existence. 
Without collective human agreement, the United States of America is no more real than 
Santa Claus. Thus, for a child, the existence of fictional characters is an institutional fact. 
One could inquire as to which institution fictional characters rely upon, since it 
has been stated that a bill depends upon the institution of commerce and a state depends 
upon the institution of government. For purposes of this study, fictional characters 
depend upon the institution of fictional existence, insofar as humans agree them into 
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existence. Since this study deals with 6-year-old and 9-year-old boys, fictional characters 
such as Santa Claus are incorporated as part of an operational definition for institutional 
facts. The question as to whether or not fictional characters are institutional facts for 
adults is a topic for future research. 
Zaibert ( 1999) applied the distinction between brute and institutional facts to 
property rights over land, stating that, "the existence of parcels of real estate is wholly a 
matter of human institutions: without humans all that exists is raw land. And what an 
owner of landed property owns is not raw land. The owner owns a land-parcel, or real 
estate ... " (p. 274). Indeed, institutions and institutional facts are required in order to own 
land. Additionally, Zaibert ( 1999) applied the distinction between brute and institutional 
facts to powers and rights, stating, "The existence of powers is, in most cases, a brute 
fact, and the existence of rights is, in most cases, an institutional fact" (p. 274). More 
research is needed in order to fully develop the latter idea. 
Brute and Institutional Values 
In addition to discussing brute and institutional facts, Genova ( 1970) also 
discussed brute and institutional values. Using the example of chess, Genova (1970) 
stated that a checkmate has more institutional value than a check. Speaking in brute 
terms, both actions are the movement of an object from one location to another. It is the 
social agreement upon the rules of chess that place higher institutional value on one 
movement of an object in comparison to the movement of another. 
The following institutional fact was found in the narratives analyzed in this study: 
They won the SEC Championship. In accordance with Genova (1970), it can be assumed 
that winning the SEC Championship has more institutional value than winning a 
scrimmage game. The distinction between brute and institutional values is a topic for 
future research. 
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CHAPTER III 
METHODOLOGY 
Research Question, Hypothesis, and Variables 
Research Question 
Is there a difference between the use of brute facts, institutional facts, and non-
institutional mental facts in narratives by 6-year-old boys and 9-year-old boys? 
Null Hypothesis 
16 
There is no difference between the use of brute facts, institutional facts, and non-
institutional mental facts in narratives by 6-year-old and 9-year-old boys. 
Directional Hypothesis 
[Because no previous research was conducted to warrant a directional 
hypothesis, it is appropriate to utilize a null hypothesis only.] 
Variables 
The independent variables are 6-year-old boys and 9-year-old boys. The 
dependent variables are the use of brute facts , institutional facts, and non-institutional 
mental facts in narratives. 
Operational Procedures 
This study utilized a total of 19 participants. Ten participants were 6-year-olds, 
and 9 participants were 9-year-olds. The participants were from the greater Hattiesburg, 
Mississippi, area. Parental permission was obtained and a consent form was signed 
before procedures were administered. Approval was gained from the Institutional 
Review Board. 
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The participants produced language in the form of spontaneous narratives . The 
language samples were collected by university students and professors in environments 
familiar to the participants. Each utterance analyzed in this investigation was produced in 
actual social commerce. 
Those utterances which were incomplete or could not be categorized readily were 
not included and were not counted in the average number of utterances per participant. 
The following are examples of utterances found in the narratives which were not included 
in this research: 
l. Your turn. 
2. The pizza. 
3. The chief school. 
4. Not that much pages. 
5. Maybe two pages. 
6. And three. 
7. And ten fingers. 
8. Like the fever on the next block. 
9. That new commercial. 
10. Not that big. 
11. pne of my teachers. 
12. One of my Spiderman movies. 
13. An Eagle hat? 
14. Mario vs. Donkey Kong. 
15. You cheater. 
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The narratives were then analyzed for the use of brute facts (B), institutional facts 
(I), and non-institutional mental facts (N), according to the following operational 
definitions: 
1. Brute facts - those facts which deal with the physical world and exist 
independent of human opinion and societal agreement, such as biology or 
chemistry, personal physical experience, physical action or movement, 
possession, and physical characteristics. 
2. Institutional facts - those facts which require human agreement and social 
institutions for their existence, such as holidays, sports leagues and teams, 
fictional characters, school courses, games, money and commerce, elected and 
appointed positions, cities/states/countries, marriage, etc. 
3. Non-institutional mental facts - those facts which require cognition and 
consciousness for their existence, yet exist independent of human institutions, 
such as desire, knowledge, likes and dislikes, favorites, love and hatred, ease 
and difficulty, need, motive, thought, forgetting and remembering, fear, etc. 
The construct validity of this research method is based upon the theory of 
constructionism. Specifically, the research focuses on the intent of the speaker by 
utilizing spontaneous utterances, as opposed to elicited utterances. The participants were 
not asked to perform tasks which they had never previously performed. Additionally, 
these utterances came from actual social use of language, thereby giving the results 
ecological validity. 
CHAPTER IV 
RESULTS 
Descriptive Evidence 
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Table 1 provides descriptive data for the study. Among 6-year-old boys, 1,946 
utterances were recorded and analyzed. As displayed in Table 2, the 6-year-old boys 
produced an average of 194.6 utterances. Brute facts (B) constituted a mean of 63.3% of 
spontaneous utterances spoken. Institutional facts (I) constituted a mean of 11.2% of 
spontaneous utterances spoken. Non-institutional mental facts (N) constituted 25.5% of 
spontaneous utterances spoken. 
Table 1 
Descriptive Group Statistics for 6-Year-Old and 9-Year-Old Boys 
Group Participants Mean Standard Deviation 
Count B- 6 10 123. l 14.1 
B -9 9 103.9 29.9 
1-6 10 2 1.5 13.8 
1- 9 9 39.6 13.7 
N-6 10 50.0 18.1 
N - 9 9 43.7 15.l 
Total - 6 10 194.6 16.3 
Total - 9 9 187. 1 28.6 
Proportional B - 6 10 .633 .057 
B -9 9 .549 . 11 4 
1- 6 JO .112 .074 
1- 9 9 .214 .073 
N-6 10 .255 .086 
N- 9 9 .237 .088 
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Among 9-year-old boys, 1684 utterances were recorded and analyzed. The 9-
year-old boys produced an average of 187.1 utterances. Brute facts (B) constituted a 
mean of 54.9% of spontaneous utterances spoken. Institutional facts (I) constituted 
21.4% of spontaneous utterances spoken. Non-institutional mental facts (N) constituted 
23.7% of spontaneous utterances spoken. 
Figure 1 provides visual comparisons of production of brute, institutional, and 
non-institutional mental facts both within age group and between age groups. Both age 
groups produced significantly more brute facts than institutional or non-institutional 
mental facts. The 6-year-old boys produced significantly more non-institutional mental 
facts than institutional facts. The 6-year-old boys produced more brute facts than the 9-
year-old boys. The 9-year-old boys produced significantly more institutional facts than 
the 6-year-old boys. The use of non-institutional mental facts was comparable between 
age groups. 
Mean Proportion of Speech Production 
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Figure 1. Mean Proportion of Production of Brute (B), Institutional (I), and Non-
Institutional Mental Facts (N) in Narratives of 6-Year-Old and 9-Year-Old Boys. 
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Appropriate Categories 
Table 2 displays the paired comparisons of production of brute, institutional, and 
non-institutional mental facts within age groups. The 6-year-old boys produced 
significantly more brute facts than institutional facts or non-institutional mental facts, and 
they produced significantly more non-institutional mental facts than institutional facts. 
The 9-year-old boys also produced significantly more brute facts than institutional 
or non-institutional mental facts . The use of institutional and non-institutional mental 
facts was not significantly different among 9-year-old boys. These results indicated that 
the three operational categories utilized in this research are appropriate and useful for 
studying narratives of 6-year-old and 9-year-old boys. 
Table 2 
Paired Comparisons for Brute (B), Institutional (I), and Non-Institutional Mental Facts 
( N) for 6-Year-Old and 9-Year-Old Boys within Age Groups 
Paired 
95% Confidence Sig. 
Upper T df (2-tailed) 
6-B -6-1 .594 16.373 9 .000 
6-B - 6-N .468 9.468 9 .000 
6-1 - 6-N -.037 -3.034 9 .014 
9-B - 9-1 .465 5.917 8 .000 
9-B - 9-N .458 4.923 8 .001 
9-1 - 9-N .065 -.605 8 .562 
As seen in Table 3, the use of institutional facts was significantly different in 6-
year-old and 9-year old boys. The 9-year-old boys produced significantly more 
institutional facts in narratives than the 6-year-old boys. The use of non-institutional 
mental facts was not significantly different across age groups. While the use of brute 
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facts was not significantly different across age groups (the significance was .069), the 6-
year-old boys tended to produce more brute facts than the 9-year-olds. 
Table 3 
Independent Samples Test Comparing Production of Brute Facts (B), Institutional Facts 
(I), and Non-Institutional Mental Facts (N) in 6-Year-Old Boys and 9-Year-Old Boys 
across Age Groups 
t-test for Equality of Means 
95% 
Sig. Mean Std. Error Confidence 
(2-tailed) Diffierence Difference 
Lower 
B-PROPORTIONAL 
.069 .0844167 .0421089 -.0077328 
Equal variances not assumed 
I-PROPORTIONAL 
.007 -.1026022 .0336500 -.1736438 
Equal variances not assumed 
N-PROPORTIONAL 
.654 .0182044 .0399492 -.0661920 
Equal variances not assumed 
Discussion 
Spontaneous Language Samples 
In order for assessment to be valid, clinicians should obtain a language sample 
that is representative of the individual's actual use of narratives. An individual's daily 
use of language is the manifestation of the speaker's intentions and mental states. A 
sample of the speaker's actual repertoire in social commerce provides a useful sample. 
According to Ninio, Snow, Pan, and Rollins (1994), "A description of a language user' s 
linguistic system must include information about the communicative intents s/he can 
express" (p. 158). Cole, Mills, and Dale (1989) stated, "For young children in particular, 
language sampling is believed to provide more representative information about the 
child's productive ability than more structured test procedures because it allows child-
initiated language production" (p. 259). 
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Intent is the irreducible nucleus of language (Bruner, 1996). Bruner (1986) 
stated, "Narrative deals with the vicissitudes of human intentions" (p. 16). It follows that 
the assessment of narrative should also deal with the human intentions. It is desirable for 
clinicians to rely on language sampling when making judgments about a child's language 
abilities. The critical question then becomes whether or not a specific language 
assessment technique addresses the intent of the speaker. Clinicians who rely on elicited 
or imitative behavior for language samples may miss the importance of the child's intents 
and subsequently misrepresent the child's language ability. When predetermined 
behaviors are elicited outside of social commerce, the resulting sample may be 
misleading. Culatta, Page, and Ellis (1983) were concerned that some elicited approaches 
may yield invalid results. Examples of such elicitation techniques are found in some of 
the standardized, normative tests used in the field. Culatta et al. (1983) stated that it is 
more efficacious to base language assessment upon "integrated.communicative 
performance," rather than performance of isolated language rules (p. 66). 
Syntagmatic-Paradigmatic Shift 
White ( 1965) summarized the existence of a "miscellany of behavior changes 
reported during the period from 5-7 years of age" (p. 208). Among those behavioral 
changes, Woodrow and Lowell ( 1916) studied word associations in children and adults 
and evidenced that a shift occurs in mental associations between childhood and 
adulthood. This shift was later identified by Ervin ( 1961) as the syntagmatic-
paradigmatic shift. Ervin ( 1961 ), referring specifically to word associations, stated that 
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there exists "a significant increase with age in the proportion of responses in the same 
grammatical class as the stimulus-word" (p. 372). Brown and Berko (1960) found that in 
a word association test, adult response words "usually belong to the same parts-of-speech 
as the respective stimulus words ... the tendency to associate words within a part-of-
speech increases with age" (p. 13). Muma and Zwycewicz-Emory (1979) applied 
"another paradigm to the shift of verbal behavior before and after seven" and found a 
verbal shift between the uses of animate contexts in five year olds and nine year olds (p. 
307). 
Having done an analysis of many of Piaget's writings, White (1965) concluded 
that for Piaget, the age of seven "is a transition point between major epochs of mental 
development" (p. 210). When discussing the growth of thought in children, Piaget (1971) 
found a distinction between children before and after seven years of age. Piaget (1971) 
stated, "From 4 to about 7 or 8 years, there is developed ... an intuitive thought whose 
progressive articulations lead to the threshold of the operation" (p. 123). Additionally, 
Piaget ( 1971) stated, " ... From 4 to 7 years we see a gradual co:.ordination of 
representative relations and thus a growing conceptualization, which leads the child from 
the symbolic or preconceptual phase to the beginnings of the operation" (p. 129). Piaget 
(1971) further stated, "From 7-8 to 11-12 years 'concrete operations' are organized, i.e. 
operational groupings of thought. .. " (p. 123 ). Thus, children under seven years of age 
deal more with intuition; children over seven years of age deal more with operations and 
groupings. 
The present study pertains to the literature on the syntagmatic-paradigmatic shift. 
This study showed that nine year old boys produced significantly more institutional facts 
in spontaneous narrative than did six year old boys. These results indicated yet another 
cognitive-linguistic shift occurring at approximately seven years of age. 
Language Sampling Size 
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Researchers and clinicians have long discussed the ideal size of a language 
sample. Heilmann, Nockerts, and Miller (2010) stated, "Sample length undoubtedly 
affects the reliability of language sample measures: Longer samples are usually more 
reliable than shorter samples" (p. 402). Lee (1974) suggested acquiring a minimum of 
"fifty complete sentences," and in some cases 100 utterances, in order to obtain useful 
results (p. 66). Cole et al. (1989) studied the test-retest, split-half, and first-half versus 
second-half results from language samples in ten children, ages 52-80 months. They 
stated that, " . .. a second 100 utterance sample may provide 27% more lexical information 
than the original 100 utterances sample" (p. 266). They further stated, " . .. a 50 utterances 
language sample may contain 73-83% of the lexical information found in a 100 utterance 
sample. Whereas a larger sample will clearly provide additional information, gathering a 
shorter sample may be more reasonable for clinical efficiency in some instances" (p. 
266). Tyack and Gottsleben (1977) stated, "We have found that 100 sentences provide a 
better (i.e., more typical) sample of a child's language than do samples of only 50 
sentences. Moreover, small errors in the analysis procedure become less significant with 
100 sentences than with the traditional 50" (p. 5). 
Gavin and Giles (1996) evaluated the reliability of language sampling measures 
and concluded, "Not until sample size reached 175 complete and intelligible utterances 
did all of the measures reach the more stringent diagnostic criterion of a coefficient 
greater than .90" (p. 1261). Muma et al. (1998) analyzed language samples of 400 
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spontaneous utterances in seven preschool children. Muma et al. ( 1998) found, "The 
overall sampling error rates for 50- and 100-utterance samples were very large, 55% and 
40%, respectively" (p. 327). Muma et al. (1998) concluded, "With a sampling error rate 
of about 15%, language samples should use 200 to 300 utterances to estimate most 
grammatical repertoires" (p. 310). 
In order to avoid an unacceptable sampling error rate, this study utilized an 
average of 191.1 utterances per participant. It would be desirable for future research to 
include 200 to 300 utterances per participant. 
A voiding examiner influence 
One could argue the point that the examiners could influence the use of 
institutional facts in the narratives of children, by directing the spontaneous conversation 
towards topics such holidays and sports. In this study, examiner influence was avoided 
due to the fact that the examiners were na1ve to the research focus on brute and 
institutional facts when the language samples were obtained. 
CHAPTER V 
CONCLUSION 
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While further research is needed, this research indicated differences in the use of 
brute, institutional, and non-institutional mental facts among 6-year-old boys and 9-year-
old boys. The 9-year-old boys in this study produced significantly more institutional 
facts in spontaneous narratives than the 6-year-old boys. These findings. indicate that 9-
year-old boys express more narratives dealing with human institutions (i.e. holidays, 
sports leagues and teams, fictional characters, systems of measurement, school courses, 
games, money and commerce, elected and appointed positions, cities/states/countries, 
marriage, etc.) than 6-year-old boys. 
Limitations of this research include both the number of 6-year-old boys and the 
number of 9-year-old boys. Further research should include a larger number of both 6-
year-old male participants and 9-year-old male participants, to more fully appreciate the 
role of brute, institutional, and non-institutional mental facts in their narratives. It is 
desirable for further research to include the use of these facts in the narratives of girls and 
the narratives of other age groups, such as 12-year-olds and 15-year-olds. 
Another limitation in this research was the lack of previously outlined operational 
definitions for brute facts, institutional facts , and non-mental institutional facts. Before 
this study, the difference in brute and institutional facts was "an empirical question 
awaiting a technique of investigation" (Brown, 1973, p. 146). The operational definitions 
included in this research now provide an appropriate technique of investigation for brute 
and institutional facts. 
An understanding of narratives by 6-year-old boys and 9-year-old boys may 
provide an insight into language abilities other than grammatical skill alone. A 
grammatical analysis may give different information than a brute and institutional fact 
analysis. A brute and institutional analysis would add to, not replace a grammatical 
analysis. 
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APPENDIXB 
RAW DATA FOR 6-YEAR-OLD BOYS 
A total of 3,630 utterances were recorded and analyzed. An average of 191.1 
utterances was obtained from each participant. The narratives of 6-year-old boys had an 
average of 194.6 utterances per participant. The greatest number of utterances obtained 
from one of the 6-year-old boys was 222 (J.S). The fewest number of utterances obtained 
from one of the 6-year-old boys was 168 (T.J.). The highest frequency of brute facts 
among the 6-year-old boys was 72.6% (L.J.), and the lowest frequency was 53.5% 
(C.K.). The highest frequency of institutional facts among the 6-year-old boys was 
21.7% (C.K.), and the lowest frequency was 1.8% (T.J.). The highest frequency of non-
institutional mental facts among the 6-year-old boys was 38.3% (S.S.), and the lowest 
frequency was 12.8% (B.H.). 
6-year-olds Utterances B I N 
J.S. 222 143 18 61 
T.J. 168 102 3 63 
S.S. 214 122 10 82 
I.T. 188 124 33 31 
C.K. 198 106 43 49 
J.H. 201 JJ 8 21 62 
L.J. 201 146 6 49 
J.R. 191 128 13 50 
B.H. 187 127 36 24 
G.S. 176 115 32 29 
Total 1946 123 1 21 5 500 
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APPENDIX C 
RAW DATA FOR 9-YEAR-OLD BOYS 
The narratives of 9-year-old boys had an average of 187.1 utterances per 
participant. The greatest number of utterances obtained from one of the 9-year-old boys 
was 212 (L.M.). The fewest number of utterances obtained from one of the 9-year-old 
boys was 123 (A.L.) . The highest frequency of brute facts among 9-year-old boys was 
73.1 % (G.L.), and the lowest frequency was 41.5% (A.L.). The highest frequency of 
institutional facts among the 9-year-old boys was 33.0% (W.S.), and the lowest frequency 
was 13.0% (L.S.). The highest frequency of non-institutional mental facts among 9-year-
old boys was 37.4% (A.L.). 
9-year-olds Utterances B I N 
P.B. 205 95 43 67 
L.S. 208 137 27 44 
A.S. 190 83 46 61 
A.L. 123 51 26 46 
G.L. 182 133 31 18 
L.M. 212 139 29 44 
M.B. 162 84 52 26 
w.s. 203 95 67 41 
D.A. 199 11 8 35 46 
Total 1684 935 356 393 
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APPENDIXD 
FACTS FOUND IN SPONTANEOUS NARRATIVES 
The following are examples of brute facts (B) found in the narratives analyzed: 
1. We read books in the morning. 
2. You can dance. 
3. I put my feet on it. 
4. It rolls it down. 
5. There's a line on the net. 
6. There's a ramp on the side. 
7. Every week we do different stuff. 
8. I was doing a program. 
9. I usually play by myself. 
10. I have all of them. 
11. I got the baby. 
12. I just turned six. 
13. Mine' s bigger. 
14. The rat takes the cheese. 
15. I'm just looking. 
The following are examples of institutional facts (I) found in the narratives analyzed: 
1. New York Giants are going to win the Super Bowl. 
2. Boxing is a sport. 
3. I was the stage manager. 
4. We went to Texas once. 
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5. My stepdad is [name]. 
6. I go to P.E. on Wednesday. 
7. I have Lego Batman. 
8. My sister's heifer is about to have a baby at the Dixie Nationals. 
9. I got Honor Roll. 
10. I have a quarter. 
11. She's a princess. 
12. They won the SEC Championship. 
13. Have you seen Paul Bunyan? 
14. Is he four inches? 
15. We won first place one time. 
The following are examples of non-institutional mental facts (N) found in the narratives: 
1. He wants to attack my sister. 
2. I like salads and taco salads. 
3. It's hard to me. 
4. I'll try and get this. 
5. I think it's equal. 
6. So, I don't want to get my feet dirty. 
7. I know it's a cucumber. 
8. I need his little float. 
9. When we get on the trampoline [name] hates [name]. 
10. He's afraid of me. 
11. We figure stuff out. 
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12. My favorite animal is the lizard. 
13. I wanted to cry. 
14. I don ' t remember the dog's name. 
15. I like doing fun work. 
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